Thereby, she develops a distinct form of a “phenomenology of plurality.” As much as these initial points of discussion situate Arendt at a critical distance from the tradition of phenomenology, equally-I would like to claim-does she elaborate on them in a genuinely phenomenological way. The third is a crucial Arendtian concern that deeply challenges the phenomenological method(s) and therefore has a special transformative potential: (3) the question of how to properly understand and describe not only action (Handeln), but also basic phenomenological terms like appearance, experience, and world/liness with respect to her “core-phenomenon” of actualized plurality. It addresses three main topics, two of which run through the phenomenological tradition as fundamental issues and fields of controversy: (1) the question of (the constitution of) reality (Wirklichkeit) and (2) the question of the constitution of meaning (Sinn). Hannah Arendt’s critique of “classic phenomenology,” shaped by Husserl and Heidegger, is a significant contribution to the development of what I would like to call “second generation phenomenology,” which contains figures such as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Levinas, Fink, and Patočka, all of whom developed their own approaches by critically working through Husserl and Heidegger.
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